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When British Petroleum consented that I be invited to give the first set of BP lectures at
London School of Economics, they were surely unaware that one of my duties in the course of the
period I spent in the Treasury was to sit in judgment on their corporate ambition to become a force
in the Western Hemisphere.  The date was 1970, and BP wished to raise a large sum of money in the
Euro-dollar market which would be spent on developing the Alaska oil-field that they had discovered
and acquiring a US oil company in order to provide an outlet for their anticipated production.  I do
not recall whether Treasury consent was required because we were then the principal shareholder, or
because such operations required exchange control permission, or both;  but the Treasury did have to
approve the project, and they put their only international economist on the committee that had to
decide whether to give the go-ahead.  It was not a difficult decision, but at least it was a sensible one,
as I am sure the sponsors of these lectures will agree.
Were BP to hatch an equally bold plan today, my successor in the Treasury would have no say
in whether or not it came to fruition.  The public sector holding 
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account would the Treasury be involved.  These are but two minor developments in in BP has been
sold off, and exchange control has been abolished, so on neithera global trend - a trend whose most
dramatic manifestation is the attempt to make 
the transition to a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
(henceforth "Eastern Europe" for the sake of brevity) that I shall be discussing in these two lectures.
This attempt at transition is one of the two great economic issues of the day, the only question
of comparable importance being that of averting a global environmental disaster.  It is an issue that
economic historians a century hence, or a millenium hence if economic history has still not ended, will
surely pore over with the sort of attention that has long been lavished on the origins of the industrial-5-
     1  Although I have seen no definitive study, I have little doubt that will remain true even after
appropriate allowances are made for the statistical practices that systematically exaggerated growth
rates in the communist countries.  
revolution.  I am one of those economists who has been fortunate enough to be at least marginally
involved in the Great Trek to the east, despite the absence of any background specialist knowledge of
the region or any ability to understand its languages.  I hope that those here who have such knowledge
will both forgive my lapses and seek to remedy them.  But when I was invited to give these lectures,
I knew that I wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to try and think through the significance
of what is happening in Eastern Europe.  I am grateful to both BP and LSE for having provided me
with this opportunity.
Having been unable to resist the temptation to stray beyond my usual terrain of international
economics, I looked for some way to link it to my area of expertise.  It occurred to me that it might
be of interest to trace the way in which world developments in the past couple of decades have
influenced the emergence of the quite unusual degree of professional consensus that seems to exist
at the moment on how the transition should be sought.  Hence I added the phrase "A Global
Perspective" to the title of these lectures.  In the second of them I shall go on to ask whether results
so far suggest that the consensus is merited.
The Failure of Socialism
The need to seek transition to a market economy arose because socialism failed to provide an
effective alternative way of organizing an economy.  This failure was not always obvious,  certainly not
when I came to LSE as a student back in the 1950s.  Growth was in fact faster in Eastern Europe at
that time,1 a fact that led Khrushchev to threaten to bury us a few years later.  Moreover, income was
distributed more equally (something that remained true right to the end, despite the privileges of the
nomenklatura).  The reasons for opposing communism related to Stalin's abuses of human rights, not
economic failure.
Yet by the 1970s it was becoming clear that the communist countries were falling behind
economically.  By the 1980s it was glaringly apparent:  the comparisons of Austria versus Hungary, East
versus West Germany, North versus South Korea, mainland China versus Taiwan, bore no reasonable
interpretation other than that one system worked and the other did not.  -6-
     2  Most of us seem to be prepared to make minor modifications in our actions (e.g. by recycling)
to further a social cause of which we approve even though we could free-ride;  or to act
professionally, meaning to follow practices aimed at benefiting a client even if rewards are not tied
closely to the outcome;  or even to risk our personal safety if the cause is sufficiently urgent and
unambiguous (e.g. in emergency situations).  But that is not enough.
Why did central planning not work?  When its feasibility was first discussed by economists
back in the 1920s, two potential obstacles were identified.  One, which was already an old issue at the
time, was the problem of inadequate motivation of economic actors.  The other was novel:  it related
to what von Mises (1920) argued would be the prohibitive information requirements needed to permit
efficient central planning when one dispensed with a price system.
If the second, more technocratic, problem were the only one, surely Oskar Lange's market
socialism (Lange 1937) - which aimed to simulate markets and the information they provide - would
have provided an answer.  In fact, however, the attempts of reform economists to move in that
direction never seemed to achieve much.  Principal emphasis on inadequate information also faces the
problem of explaining why for a time the communist economies did work tolerably well - although
one can argue that a system without the information mediated via market-clearing prices became
progressively less adequate as the economy became more complex.
Thus, while I think the information difficulty was a real one, it seems to me less fundamental
than the old ideological issue of motivation.  This relates to one of the two basic emotional appeals
of socialism (the other being the appeal to a sense of class injustice).  Socialism promised to replace
the base appeal to pecuniary self-interest as the principal motivation for economic action by something
more noble, like altruism.  I am not an uncritical adherent of public choice theory, with its demeaning
assumption that everyone in public life is there only for what they can get out of it and totally
uninterested in promoting the public good.  But that extreme assumption is surely less far-fetched
than the opposite assumption that everyone will always work altruistically to promote the public good,
or what they are told is the public good, with no prospect of personal reward.  Few of us are prepared
to act month after month like socialist heroes were supposed to, especially after word gets out that
the elite is engaged in rent-seeking.2  -7-
And so one got the attempts to work as little as possible and the resultant fights over norms.
Perhaps even more devastating was the lack of motivation to care for - to economize on the use of -
capital and natural resources (capital had no "guardian", as George Soros, 1990, put it).  Another area
that clearly suffered was the incentive to innovate.  Even the neglect of the environment - the most
paradoxical failure of socialism to those of us who were brought up on Baumol's vision of the state
as the guardian of externalities (Baumol 1952) - seems to have been a result of a breakdown of the
professional ethic bred by stretching beyond breaking point the divorce of personal reward from
achievement.  The record suggests that greed can be contained by competition to work in socially
benign ways far more easily than it can be displaced.
The diagnosis of inadequate motivation is consistent with the historical record of progressive
decay from the early period of heroic accomplishments when many surely were motivated by idealism,
through the black period when fear provided an all-too-common motivation, to the pervasive cynicism
that led to stagnation by the 1970s.  The outlook was for worse to come:  the extraction of energy and
materials was encountering diminishing returns, while the input of energy and materials per unit of
GDP was actually rising rather than declining.  Sooner or later someone had to come to power who
was conscious of the yawning and widening gulf between life under socialism and that in the market
economies, and who would try and do something about it.  The accession of such individuals led to
limited reforms in Hungary and Poland.  But the major event was the coming to power of Mikhail
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, with no big brother breathing down his neck.
Gorbachev's program of perestroika was intended to address the problem of missing
motivation.  The principal instrument to that end was the Law on State Enterprises of 1987, which
devolved power down to the enterprise level.  Enterprises were no longer required to transfer all their
profits to the state at the end of the year, effected by the expedient of cancelling bank balances.  A
profits tax was created instead, and enterprises were allowed to pay a part of their after-tax profits to
the workers, as well as to use another part to make investments determined by the enterprise
management.  Many enterprises were also given the right to export directly, rather than having to go
through a foreign trade organization, and were allowed to keep a portion of their hard currency
earnings, with the intention of providing an incentive to develop exports.-8-
However, the attempt to build some incentives into the economy turned out to do more harm
than good.  A first problem was that the loss of tax revenue through the effective lowering of
corporate tax rates was not compensated by increased tax revenue from some other source or a
reduction in expenditure:  on the contrary, it reinforced the loss of tax revenue that had already resulted
from Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign.  Within two years the Soviet Union was transformed from
a paragon of fiscal virtue into a country with a chronic budget deficit of close to 10% of GDP.  The
ubiquitous price controls ensured that the resulting inflation was repressed and a monetary overhang
built up instead, but that made the inflation more rather than less damaging, as goods progressively
disappeared from the shelves.  This simple failure of macroeconomic prudence is the major
explanation for the breakdown of the old Soviet economy.  
But there was also a microeconomic factor that underlay the Soviet collapse.  One of the major
papers that emerged from the School during my period as an undergraduate here was Lipsey and
Lancaster's general theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).  When we came across it in
our  final year, I recall considerable puzzlement as to whether second-best theory dealt with
pathological cases of no practical relevance, whether it destroyed the scientific basis for all reform
proposals (given that in practice it is inconceivable that all but one of the conditions for Pareto
optimality will be satisfied simultaneously), or whether it contained important implications for
economic policy from which reformers can benefit rather than be paralyzed.  Perhaps the rest of the
profession decided years ago that the third view is right, but there is surely no longer any room to
doubt that conclusion after contemplating experience in Eastern Europe:  partial reform repeatedly
worsened rather than improved the situation, for second-best reasons.  Reformers need to take care
to design programs that are immune to sabotage by the second-best.
Many anecdotes could be cited to illustrate how partial reforms led to worse outcomes, as
second-best theory asserts can happen.  I will restrict myself to what is still my favourite:  Jeffrey
Sachs's story of how Poland had emerged as an exporter of semi-tropical flowers prior to the big bang
at the beginning of 1990.  No central planner would ever have dreamt of doing anything so idiotic as
subtracting value by having a country with Poland's climatic endowment export semi-tropical flowers,-9-
but decentralized enterprises pursuing their self-interest in the face of energy prices that were under
10% of the world level were entirely capable of doing so.
I suspect there is an opportunity for a wonderful thesis in compiling a list of these anecdotes
and examining them analytically with a view to seeking some measure of just how important second-
best considerations really were.  However, to the best of my knowledge nothing like that has yet been
done, and so I have to restrict myself to asserting that Polish exports of semi-tropical flowers were not
an isolated case.  To tell agents to pursue their self-interest without a set of prices that reflect relative
scarcities so as to guide decisions in a socially beneficial way is to invite economic decline.  And
socialist prices were never intended to guide allocative decisions, which were made by the central
planners rather than by decentralized enterprises:  prices were chosen to further distributional rather
than allocative ends.
The Design of a Reform Programme
Thus central planning failed primarily because it lacked a mechanism to motivate agents to
make routine decisions in socially beneficial ways, and especially to make innovation and economy in
the use of capital a part of the routine way of doing things.  In some cases attempts to provide the
missing motivation made things worse rather than better, most conspicuously where they were allowed
to undermine macroeconomic discipline but also more insidiously by giving rise to pervasive second-
best problems.  What would these conclusions suggest for someone who wanted to give the citizens
of those countries a chance to catch up with living standards in the West - in other words, for an East
European reform economist or one of their Western advisers?
A first implication concerns the content of the needed reform programme.  The economy must
be transformed to a market economy:  half-measures will not do.  That is not to pre-judge the choice
between the laissez-faire version of a market economy that Anglo-Saxons in principle tend to subscribe
to, the German social market economy sketched by Hans Tietmeyer here last week, or the Japanese
variant where the corporation regards itself as responsible to a series of stakeholders.  What it does rule
out is the sort of massive public sector sought by socialist parties in Western Europe in the early
postwar years or the state-directed economies built up by many third-world countries in the 1960s and-10-
     3  The ten headings were:  fiscal discipline;  reorientation of public expenditure priorities toward
(e.g.) health and education at the expense of defence, administration, indiscriminate subsidies, and
white elephants;  tax reform;  financial liberalization;  a single competitive exchange rate for current
account transactions;  trade liberalization;  liberalization of foreign direct investment; 
privatization;  deregulation;  and the establishment of secure property rights in the informal sector. 
These can be summarized as macroeconomic discipline, microeconomic liberalization, and outward
orientation.  See Williamson (1990).
     4  The list was drawn up as a positive description of what was being urged rather than a
normative one of what I thought was needed.  In fact I largely sympathize with its content,
although the agenda is distinctly circumscribed on the equity side for my taste.
     5  Carlos Prima Braga, who is responsible for this gibe, seems to have overlooked Havanna.
1970s.  Leszek Balcerowicz of Poland, Vaclav Klaus of Czechoslovakia, and ultimately the Russian
reform economists rejected the search for a third way between communism and capitalism.  Klaus as
usual expressed it particularly forcefully when (as mentioned by Hans Tietmeyer) he quipped that "the
third way is the quickest way to the third world". 
As it happens, the third world had also been coming to that conclusion in the second half of
the 1980s.  I first realized this in 1989, which prompted us at the Institute for International Economics
to organise a conference designed to explore the nature and extent of the change in attitudes that was
occurring in Latin America.  This conference was based on a paper of mine called "What Washington
Means by Policy Reform" which presented a taxonomy of the policy reforms that were being
commended to Latin America by mainstream opinion in Washington (basically the US government
and the international financial institutions).3  I labelled this, rather unwisely, the "Washington
consensus".  It did not occur to me that to use this term to describe a list of the policy reforms that
were being urged on Latin America might be interpreted by my Latin friends as implying that
Washington had figured out what needed to be done and was engaged in imposing economic
correctness on them.  In fact my view is that Washington had come to those views4 as part of a
worldwide intellectual trend to which Latin America had itself contributed, primarily through the work
of Hernando de Soto (1989), and which has been most dramatically manifested in Eastern Europe.
But since this explanation does not seem to have assuaged my critics, let me endorse in substance their
latest barb, which is that the term is a misnomer because the Washington consensus is now being
implemented in every capital of the hemisphere bar Washington!5  One fears that the results of the-11-
early primary elections may push Washington further along the populist path that it still condemns
when practiced elsewhere.
The substance of the reforms being sought in Eastern Europe obviously overlaps those that
have been taken up in one Latin country after another for the past seven years.  Nor are these the only
parts of the world where macroeconomic discipline, microeconomic liberalism and outward orientation
have acquired a new respectability.  Here in Britain Mrs Thatcher was associated with at least the first
two causes, which have now been endorsed across the political spectrum.  In Southern Europe, East
Asia, Australia and New Zealand, now India, and even spottily in sub-Saharan Africa, the same
revolution in economic attitudes has occurred.  The mainstream economics that was taught to
students here at LSE in the 1950s, but that we did not quite trust in our political hearts, has
triumphed.
In my view that triumph results once again from a set of stylized facts that are too apparent
to ignore.  The crucial fact is that the most successful cases of development have occurred in resource-
poor economies which chose capitalism, macroeconomic prudence and outward orientation rather than
resource-rich economies that used the rents from resource exploitation plus deficit spending and
foreign borrowing to build up large state sectors and invest in import-substituting industries.  The
professional literature (I think particularly of the painstaking accumulation of evidence by economists
such as Balassa) has tended to support the obvious inference that in a broad sense the policies
produced the results, although there remains debate about exactly what those policies were (one can
hardly invoke Korea to justify the minimalist state and laissez-faire).  
Let me add two points.  One is that macro discipline, micro liberalization and outward
orientation are supposed to supplement rather than displace the emphasis on savings and investment,
and especially of investment in human capital, to be found in the development literature.  The other
is that the new orthodoxy crystallized in the "Washington consensus" has received further
confirmation in the eyes of many of us by the recovery that is now clearly gathering force in Latin
America.  It took up to five years for these policies to begin to pay off, but they are now doing so.
Adjustment is an investment and not an exercise in self-flagellation.-12-
While the reform programmes in the economies in transition of Eastern Europe are clearly
pursuing those same three objectives, however, the task is altogether more demanding than anything
confronted elsewhere in the world.   The reason is the need to create the institutions of a market
economy from the ground up.  When the Berlin wall fell few of us had ever given any thought as to
how one would go about organizing a transition to a market economy, since it had not occurred to us
that this would be a question that would arise in our lifetime.  The exciting thing about being a part
of the Great Trek to the east is that one is repeatedly challenged to think about the logic of the
institutions that underlie the market economy, which we had always taken for granted.  What legal
infrastructure is needed to support the development of markets?  What arrangements for corporate
governance result in enterprises acting in the social interest?  Can commercial banks fulfill their
principal social function if they lack employees trained in the art of loan appraisal?  If the subject of
economics gains a new dimension out of the events in Eastern Europe, it will surely be by a new
understanding of the institutional bases of a market economy.  Perhaps we shall even get some insights
into the debate that never quite seems to happen about the relative merits of alternative forms of
market economy (the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on profit maximization alone, versus the German social
market economy, versus the Japanese tradition of corporations responsible to a series of stakeholders).
Of course, the challenge facing Eastern Europe is broader than simply that of making the
transition to a market economy, massive as the latter is.  Every one of those countries is also
attempting to replace the authoritarian regime of the past by a democratic system.  There seems to be
a general assumption these days that democracy and a market economy are natural complements.  I
hope that this turns out to be right, but I cannot help recalling that only 15 years ago the opposite was
generally assumed to be true in Latin America:  a market economy was something that only the military
regimes in the Southern Cone would either have wished to establish or conceivably have been capable
of establishing.  For the moment we should treat the natural complementarity of democracy and the
market as a hypothesis and (for some of us) a hope;  but it is not an established fact.
So far as the former Soviet Union is concerned, there is a third historical transformation being
attempted simultaneously with democratization and economic transition:  the dismantling of the last
of the world's great multinational empires.  All sorts of long-suppressed nationalist tensions have-13-
suddenly been released, leading to a whole range of extra economic problems stemming from the
likelihood of monetary disintegration and the possibility of a breakdown of trade relations.  In
association with a Ukrainian-born economist, Oleh Havrylyshyn, I have already attempted to address
some of those problems (Havrylyshyn and Williamson 1991).  In these lectures I simply note that this
extra dimension makes the challenge facing the new nations of the CIS even more extraordinary than
that faced by their neighbours to their immediate west, who in turn confront more dimensions than
do reforming developing countries, let alone anything that we in the West have attempted in living
memory.
The Case for a Bang
Let us return and focus on the economic aspects of the transition.  There has never been much
difficulty in identifying the long list of reforms that need to be made in order to convert a planned
economy to a market economy:  
-establish property rights;  
-abolish the planning mechanism and state orders, and make enterprises                 
autonomous units;
-privatize;  
-harden budget constraints;  
-legalize the firing of workers;  
-liberalize prices;  
-break up monopolistic enterprises and introduce anti-monopoly legislation;   -establish a
competitive commercial banking system and recapitalize the banks;   -make the central bank
responsible for controlling inflation;  
-create a social safety net;  
-eliminate the monetary overhang;  
-reform the tax system;  
-secure fiscal discipline;  
-permit inward foreign direct investment;  -14-
     6  Perhaps the Argentine Austral Plan and the Brazilian Cruzado Plan were also intended to be
big bangs, but they forgot to include the fiscal discipline that is an indispensable element of any
programme that deserves to be called a big bang.
-establish convertibility for current account transactions at a single, competitive   
exchange rate;  
-liberalize trade.  
The focus of the debate has been on how those reforms should be ordered, or, in the jargon,
sequenced.  In particular, there has been passionate debate on the merits or otherwise of a "big bang".
The widespread adoption of big bangs in Eastern Europe is a remarkable break from the
postwar pattern.  Until the Polish program at the beginning of 1990, there had been only one
programme that deserved to be called a big bang6 since the Erhard programme of 1948 (alluded to by
Hans Tietmeyer during last week's Erhard memorial lecture).  Even when Indonesia had to stabilize
a near-hyperinflation following the ouster of Sukarno in 1967, the approach was gradualist.  Similar
recommendations for trying to ease hyperinflation down over several years were being given to Bolivia
in 1985.  Credit for the rejection of that advice in favour of an attempt to stop inflation in its tracks
should go at least in part to Jeffrey Sachs, who was advising the candidate who did not win the 1985
Bolivian election, but who bequeathed some calculations of the extent of the fiscal contraction that
would be required to the incoming team.  
Sachs was not, however, responsible for the Bolivian decision to go for a big bang that would
combine stabilization, liberalization and opening up of the economy to the outside world.  That was
a decision of the Bolivian team taken during the period immediately after the election of Paz
Estenssoro when Sachs was not advising the Bolivian government nor present in Bolivia.  He did,
however, approve strongly of their courageous approach, and he became the transmission mechanism
that brought the idea to Eastern Europe, for he played a key role in mustering support for a big bang
in Poland in the second half of 1989.  Doubtless big bangs might have been adopted anyway, without
the Bolivian precedent or the intermediation of Sachs, but it is nonetheless an interesting reflection
on our times that half a dozen policy-makers in a poverty-stricken country high in the Andes should-15-
     7  See, for example, Edwards (1984) and McKinnon (1991).
have provided the model for the programmes that are attempting to terminate the biggest failed social
experiment in history.
Rather to my surprise, I not only endorsed the Bolivian decision to go for a big bang, but I
have also found myself arguing the need for rather large bangs in Eastern Europe.  I find this
surprising because I had long been an instinctive gradualist.  I took it for granted that the gradual
liberalization of the British and European economies in the postwar years was the natural way to go
about it, and laid the basis for the boom of the 1960s.  I have argued for trade liberalization to be done
gradually, on the ground that there is a limit to the rate at which resources can be redeployed into new
export industries, and that until such redeployment is possible it is better that resources be used to
produce something, even if it be of low value-added, than that they be thrown into disuse and add zero
value.  I also criticized liberalization in the Southern Cone of South America a decade ago as
precipitate.  In particular, I was persuaded that it was a mistake to liberalize the capital account of the
balance of payments so soon - a position that has now become conventional wisdom, since liberalized
trade (to avoid the danger of immiserizing growth), a well-established non-traditional export sector
(to ensure that the trade balance is not jeopardized by real appreciation from a capital inflow), and a
liberalized domestic financial system (to distribute a capital inflow to activities with high rates of
return), are all recognized as desirable preconditions.7
My preference for gradualism led me a year ago to ask:  suppose you want to do as little as
possible  simultaneously,  in  the  interest  of  minimizing  administrative  overload  and  economic
disruption, what things must be done at the same time?  What is the content of a "minimum bang"?
Let us specifically ask:  what else has to be done at the time that prices are liberalized?  To
begin with, do all prices have to be liberalized simultaneously?  I have failed to identify any appealing
principle that could guide the order in which prices are gradually liberalized.  One possible principle,
which was applied in Russia last month to retain controls on "socially necessary goods" (like bread and
milk and vodka), is to free luxuries first and necessities last.  But, if producers have any opportunity
to vary the output mix in response to price incentives, that leads to perverse results:  producers have-16-
an incentive to divert output toward luxuries, and the shortages of necessities become even more
chronic than before.  In principle that could be countered by subsidizing the production of necessities,
if the budget can stand the strain, but we generally teach that it would be more efficient to free prices
and subsidize needy consumers.  In any event, such subsidies do not always seem to work:  Russia
continues to subsidize the socially necessary goods on which price controls were retained, but reports
indicate that milk has nonetheless become even scarcer since the beginning of January because of the
diversion of supplies into the production of butter and cheese, the prices of both of which have been
liberated.  If one cannot find any plan for gradual price decontrol that begins to look sensible, one is
driven to the conclusion that prices should be liberalized simultaneously.  That in itself is enough to
guarantee a pretty big bang, even if a few prices - typically of utilities, rents and energy - are exempted
from decontrol.
Could macroeconomic stabilization precede price liberalization?  Sometimes:  where consumer
subsidies are not enormous, it may be possible to establish fiscal discipline before prices are
liberalized.  But in a number of the East European economies subsidies had become such a large
source of spending that it had become almost inconceivable that budget balance could be restored
without the price liberalization needed to dispense with the subsidies;  in those cases it was impractical
to stabilize before freeing prices.
Can stabilization be postponed to a later stage, until after prices have been liberalized?  It is
difficult enough for an established market economy to function tolerably under conditions of high
inflation:  enterprises cannot be expected to learn to make allocative decisions with reference to prices
that are far from equilibrium (as relative prices always are at any particular point in time during a rapid
inflation).  The Bhagwati-Krueger study on trade liberalization (Krueger 1978), the first of the large
cross-country comparative studies to be undertaken, established back in the 1970s that attempts to
open up an economy to the outside world were time and again thwarted by the absence of
macroeconomic discipline.  Since then the World Bank has studied the success of structural
adjustment lending, and affirms emphatically that stabilization should not be delayed until after
liberalization.  It is true that one can cite odd instances of countries that started to liberalize before
stabilizing (Mexico) or that undertook a major liberalization following a half-baked stabilization-17-
(Turkey), but the professional consensus is nonetheless that stabilization needs to come at the
beginning of a reform programme. 
Stabilization requires not only the establishment of fiscal discipline so as to be able to limit
future monetary emission, but also that any monetary overhang that may have built up during the
period of repressed inflation should be eliminated.  If this is not done deliberately either by a monetary
reform or by the sale of public-sector assets, it will occur automatically at the time of price
liberalization by a corrective inflation.  Finally, stabilization requires that monetary emission be
stringently controlled, which implies not just fiscal discipline but also the hardening of enterprise
budget constraints.  
That provides one of the several reasons why enterprise autonomy should also be part of the
minimum bang.  We have already discussed the second-best problems that arise if enterprises are
allowed to act autonomously prior to prices being freed to reflect relative scarcities.  Conversely, prices
cannot be freed until enterprises are autonomous, because it is the enterprises that have to set
decontrolled prices.  Hence enterprises should be made autonomous, and planning abolished, at the
same time that prices are freed.  
Enterprise autonomy is but a first step on the road to privatization.  It may be possible to
make a start with small privatization prior to price liberalization, and one can agree with the critics of
the Russian programme that it would have been desirable to have privatized much of the supply and
distribution network prior to price liberalization.  Nevertheless, it would be wrong to privatize very
much prior to price liberalization, for the fundamental reason that one would not want to risk driving
potentially viable enterprises into bankruptcy, as could happen if hard budget contraints were enforced
when sub-equilibrium output prices were being enforced and resulted in a firm trading at a loss.  In
practice there is not much danger of privatization being carried too far prior to price liberalization, for
privatization is inherently a slow process if it is to be done well, meaning that property rights will be
well-defined, that an effective structure of corporate governance is put in place, and that the state gets
a reasonable price for the assets that are sold.
An implication of enterprise autonomy is that the enterprise should be free to fire workers who
contribute less to the value of output than they cost the firm to employ:  indeed, one could hardly-18-
     8  Convertibility means a right to buy foreign currency with domestic currency.  Current account
convertibility means that that right is available only where it is needed to pay for imports of goods
and services: it is in practice usually circumscribed by excluding or restricting payment for foreign
travel, on the ground that it is not administratively possible to preclude illicit use of unlimited
travel facilities to export capital.  East European discourse is customarily couched in terms of
internal convertibility, which means the right of residents to buy foreign currency when needed to
buy imported goods and services (other than tourism).  The main difference from current account
convertibility is that it excludes the right of foreign investors to remit profits;  since all countries
grant that right as well, in the interest of attracting foreign investment, I am unclear why they stick
to the term internal convertibility.
contemplate enforcing a hard budget constraint until enterprises have that right.  But it is politically
impossible - or, if it isn't, it ought to be - to contemplate allowing workers to be fired without
providing some form of social safety net for them independent of the enterprise, which used to be the
main provider of social security.  Hence the provision of a social safety net is something that has to
be done no later than enterprises are made autonomous.
Allowing autonomous enterprises to charge whatever prices they see fit runs the danger of
inviting massive price increases in an economy where the planners had deliberately built up monopoly
sources of supply (on the theory that economies of scale are unlimited and that competition is
wasteful, and abetted by the systematic underpricing of transport).  In the long run it may be possible
to break up some of these monopolistic enterprises into competing firms, but this takes time.  One
should at least be able to eliminate entry restrictions immediately, but it would be unwise to rely on
a rapid buildup of competition from new entrants.  But there is one other source from which it should
be possible to elicit at least some competitive pressures to discipline price increases quickly, and that
is the rest of the world.  This provides the case for moving quickly to eliminate quantitative trade
restrictions and to make the currency convertible on current account.8  Note that there is a persuasive
reason why one should advise these countries to move to current account convertibility far quicker
than Western Europe did in the postwar years - Western Europe had a functioning market economy
and prices that more or less reflected scarcity, so that convertibility merely allowed best advantage to
be taken of relations with the rest of the world.  In contrast, Eastern Europe needs to import a price
system and competitive discipline if it is to get a working market economy any time soon.
Hence I concluded that a minimum bang needed to include widespread price liberalization,
accompanied by the establishment of enterprise autonomy and current account convertibility and,-19-
unless they had already been accomplished, by macroeconomic stabilization and the creation of a social
safety net.  Such a package cannot be introduced overnight:  it needs a certain amount of time to be
designed and legislated.  That time has varied from under two months in Russia to almost exactly a
year in Czechoslovakia.  But, once preparations have been made, the argument is that one should make
a decisive, broad-based move from one set of rules to another.
Thus, despite being a temperamental gradualist, I came to the conclusion that in the specific
circumstances of the economies in transition a "minimum bang" is in practice not much different to
the sort of "big bang" advocated by Jeffrey Sachs, who is a temperamental advocate of shock treatment.
A rather similar prescription has in fact found remarkably broad acceptance among mainstream
economists.  Obviously the details of presentation varied, but I am not aware of any essential
differences between the advice in the IMF/World Bank/OECD/EBRD (1990) study on the Soviet
economy, the EC Commission's report on the Soviet Union (European Commission 1990), the IIASA
report (Peck 1991), the WIDER study (Blanchard et al 1990), the advice dispensed by Aslund,
Dornbusch, Fischer, Layard, Sachs and Summers, or my minimum bang.  The profession for once
seemed to have reached timely agreement on some novel and pretty fundamental issues of momentous
import.
However, we now have over two years of experience with reform programmes that more or less
follow those recommendations, and the outcome so far is not obviously reasssuring.  Perhaps it was
inevitable that the initial euphoria would give way to gloom, but one can hardly reproach the citizens
of Eastern Europe for a certain gloom at this stage.  I shall talk in the next lecture about the reasons
for the current pessimism, enquire into the causes of the disappointments, ask whether there is reason
to revise the advice that we have been offering, and discuss whether the West should do more to try
and ensure that the transition is successfully completed.-20-
LECTURE 2
In my first lecture I reviewed the reasons for the failure of the scoialist experiment and
outlined the main components of the reform package that we economists, who seem to be remarkably
united on this issue, have concluded are needed to allow the transition to a market economy.  I pointed
out the basic similarity in the content of the reforms that have been increasingly implemented around
the world for a little over a decade now, and those that are being introduced at breakneck speed in
Eastern Europe, which are perforce more extensive because of the prior absence of the infrastructure
of a market economy but are directed at the same three objectives of stabilization, liberalization and
opening up.  I described the logic underlying the mainstream position on the main controversy that
has arisen during the debate on the transition, namely the merits of a "big bang" (an idea whose roots
I suggested could be traced to Bolivia).
I shall start this second lecture by examining the facts about what has happened so far in the
transition.  I shall proceed to examine alternative explanations for the massive declines in output that
have occurred, and will then ask what lessons need to be drawn from this experience, including lessons
for what the West ought to be doing.
Experience of the Transition
The breadth of the reforms that have been introduced in Eastern Europe in the two and a half
years since the fall of the Berlin wall is truly awesome.  First Poland, then Eastern Germany, then
Czechoslovakia, then Bulgaria, then Romania, and most recently Russia have adopted in substance the
package of price liberalization, fiscal 
(and in most cases monetary) discipline, enterprise autonomy, provision of a social safety net,
devaluation and current account convertibility, as recommended by the mainstream view outlined in
my last lecture.  Eastern Germany has gone much further, notably with massive privatization already
accomplished by the Treuhandanstalt.  Hungary has got about as far as any of the others, though
through a piecemeal ("gradualist") program that eschewed a big bang.  The CIS states other than
Russia, and Albania, have still to take the plunge.
The expectation was that these programs would produce a sharp initial increase in prices, a
"corrective inflation", as prices were liberalized, the monetary overhang was inflated away, and-21-
devaluation pulled prices up.  But it was hoped that, after the initial step price increase, inflation would
quickly die away, since there would no longer be a monetary overhang, fiscal and monetary discipline
would eliminate excess demand, and (in the Central European countries, at least) the fixed exchange
rate would act as a nominal anchor.  All countries (except Eastern Germany, which experienced an
effective revaluation when monetary unification occurred) did indeed have large initial price increases -
in every case substantially larger than anticipated.  In one case, Czechoslovakia, this was a one-shot
increase as expected, and price stability was achieved within months of the big bang.  In other cases
inflation did fall back from the months of (and in some cases immediately before) the big bang, but
nevertheless showed a worrying degree of persistence that has had to be accommodated through a
flexible exchange rate policy (a frequently adjusted peg in Hungary, a crawling peg in Poland, floating
rates in Bulgaria and Russia).  Inflation remains a problem.
But the worst news relates to output.  Table 1 shows rounded versions of recent Morgan-
Stanley estimates of how far output has fallen since 1988, before the 
communist system started to unravel.  To provide some historical perspective I also provide figures
of the output decline in the United States, Britain and Germany during the Great Depression, and in
Germany and Japan at the conclusion of World War Two.  Clearly ouput has fallen at least as far in
Eastern Europe as it did during the historic disaster of the 1930s Depression, although its decline is
still somewhat less than that in Germany and Japan at the end of the war.  It is of a different order of
magnitude to the little local difficulties confronting Messrs Major and Bush as a consequence of the
current Western recession.
It is true that the extent of the fall in output is almost certainly exaggerated by the official
figures.  The reason is that the collection of statistical data is largely, or in some cases wholly, confined
to the state enterprises and largely or wholly ignores the private sector.  Since the public sector is
declining while the private sector is growing, in most cases at dramatically high rates (although from
a small base), the actual situation is somewhat less bleak than portrayed.  But the needed correction
is probably worth only a percentage point or two of GDP, so the stylized fact of imploding output
remains.-22-
Critics of the big bang strategy claim that these output falls provide strong support for their
position.  Before assessing that contention, I want to discuss how far we understand the causes of the
collapse in output.
A Taxonomy of the Sources of Output Decline
Let us start by reviewing the sort of conventional taxonomy that we would use in discussing
the sources of an output decline in developing countries (Table 2).  Output might fall either because
of demand or supply.  Demand factors would be broken down into those stemming from external
demand and internal demand respectively.  External demand might fall exogenously, because (for
example) of a world recession, or it might fall because the country had allowed its currency to become
overvalued on the foreign exchanges (typically as a result of holding the exchange rate fixed in nominal
terms despite an internal inflation much above the world rate).  A fall in internal demand would result
in a Keynesian demand deficiency.  A special case of the latter arises where the government is forced
to deflate domestic demand because of a balance of payments constraint (as analyzed in the two-gap
model).  The supply factors that cause output declines are typically exogenous shocks like bad weather
or natural disasters.
The first few entries in our taxonomy can remain unchanged when we turn to Eastern Europe.
It is certainly still true that a reduction in demand from abroad may cause output to decline.  If the
production facilities were specifically geared to supplying the market that vanishes, output cannot be
restored through macroeconomic policy.  This is generally believed to be true of the empirically
important case of this phenomenon - the 50%-odd decline in Soviet demand in 1991, which was
important in all the other economies in transition.  Most of the goods for which demand dried up
were "shoddy goods" that were unsaleable in the West at any price.  
Dani Rodrik (1992, Table 5.2) has recently made estimates of the extent of the output loss
occasioned in the three Central European countries in 1991 by the collapse in Soviet orders.  Excluding
the terms of trade cost of the change in the CMEA trade regime, which enters at a later stage of the
taxonomy, that cost amounted to 1.6% of GDP in Poland, 2.2% in Czechoslovakia, and 4.5% in
Hungary.  Eastern Germany and Romania also suffered, though perhaps to a more modest extent,-23-
     9  Akerlof et al (1991) argued that the output costs could have been diminished by a well-
designed labour subsidy.
while the impact on Bulgaria was presumably massive in view of Bulgaria's former dependence on the
Soviet market (over 60% of its exports were shipped there).  The order in which the countries are listed
in Table 3 gives my guess of the relative magnitude of the impact of this factor on the various
countries.
The final column of Table 3 presents a first assessment of the welfare significance of each
source of output decline.  An exogenous decline in foreign demand confronts a country with an
unavoidable welfare loss, which is greater the more difficult it is to transfer the resources formerly used
to produce exports into alternative uses.  The losses stemming from the disappearance of the Soviet
market were undoubtedly severe.
The second heading is currency overvaluation.  An overvalued currency can destroy the
tradable-goods industries and thus damage output, as anyone who recalls British experience in the early
1980s will be well aware.  So far this seems to have been important only in Eastern Germany, where
the 1:1 exchange rate chosen at the time of German monetary union made East German costs
hopelessly uncompetitive.  I am not claiming that matters could have been materially alleviated by
choosing a different nominal exchange rate at the time of unification:  on the contrary, the fact that
East German wages rose sharply after unification suggests that the competitive benefits would have
been inflated away very quickly.  Exchange rate policy was impotent because of the high degree of
labour mobility combined with the willingness of West Germany to pay almost unlimited sums to
curtail the migration of workers to the west.  It nonetheless remains true that the uncompetitive
exchange rate led to the collapse of output in East Germany.9  It looked last year as though the Polish
zloty was in danger of becoming overvalued, but Poland began to crawl last October, perhaps just in
time.  Thus the only country that I enter under this head in Table 3 is Eastern Germany. 
In general I would classify currency overvaluation as a social loss due to policy error (an
"avoidable loss"), although a modest and temporary overvaluation might be a rational part of a
programme of combating inflation and therefore be classified as an investment in stability.  (The
phrase "avoidable loss when excessive" in Table 3 is intended to convey the notion that some output-24-
loss from this cause may be a rational investment, but that when carried to excess it involves social
waste.)  But in the particular case of Eastern Germany I think it is fair to classify the overvaluation as
exogenous, because of Western Germany's willingness to pay subsidies of over 50% of Eastern
German GDP to curtail migration.
The third heading is Keynesian demand deficiency.  Fiscal and monetary policy may be
tightened with a view to controlling inflation or correcting the balance of payments, and the
consequent reduction in nominal demand may cause a fall in output for Keynesian reasons.  We know
that in principle a totally credible stabilization programme might not have any output cost at all in the
presence of rational expectations, but we also know that stabilization typically does have a temporary
cost in terms of lost output, perhaps because of the need to build credibility, perhaps because not all
expectations are rational, and perhaps because of the structure of contracts.  Such output losses are in
the nature of an investment if they are no larger than is necessary to achieve stabilization, and a social
waste if demand deflation overshoots.
There was a vigorous debate in Poland as to whether demand deflation was responsible for
the depth of the Polish recession.  For a time I subscribed to the view that an excessive devaluation
of the zloty at the beginning of 1990 had replaced monetary overhang by monetary stringency (by
reducing real balances) and in that way led to excessive deflation.  The fiscal surplus of the first half
of 1990 reinforced the charge of overkill.  But in an interesting paper Stanislaw Gomulka (1992
forthcoming) points out that the bulk of the Polish money supply at the end of 1989 was in the form
of dollars rather than zlotys, and therefore its internal purchasing power tended to be increased rather
than decreased by devaluation.  Meanwhile the budget deficit has reappeared while inflation has not
vanished.  It thus seems difficult to classify Poland as a case of deflationary overkill.
The one country that does seem to me to have erred in that direction is Czechoslovakia.  This
is a shame because the microeconomics of the transition were handled better there than anywhere else:
the government took a year to prepare its plans and then moved with a broad-ranging package of
measures, very much in line with the recommendations summarized in my first lecture.  Until the end
of 1990 the economy remained in macro balance:  output fell only marginally, inflation was low, there
was no appreciable monetary overhang or external deficit, the budget was balanced, and the foreign-25-
     10  Even without the mistake of announcing that intention months ahead of time in a public
lecture at LSE!  Incidentally, the objection to going to near the black market rate is that, since  black
markets are marginal markets driven by attempted capital flight prior to stabilization, there is a
strong presumption that the exchange rate established there will be too weak to sustain a desirable
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pay profit taxes.
     11  Special cases are indicated in Table 3 by a dash preceding them in the first column. 
     12  Strictly speaking one should refer to a trade deficit that can be safely financed on a
sustainable basis rather than implying that only trade balance is acceptable in the medium term.
debt remained modest.  These figures provided no convincing rationale for allowing fiscal policy to
produce a surplus of 8% of GDP, devaluing to close to the black market rate,10 or raising the interest
rate to a real rate of 20% a year, let alone doing all three together.  That looks like deflationary overkill
to me.  
The fourth reason for output loss can be considered a special case of the preceding one,11 when
a demand deficiency is dictated by a shortage of foreign exchange.  When I was a student we took it
as axiomatic that inadequate foreign exchange could force a country into deflationary policies, but since
this seems to be doubted nowadays by those whose training is too narrowly neoclassical it may be
worth spelling out why a freely floating exchange rate does not make this a non-problem.  Consider
a country whose exports are less than its full-employment imports at a competitive exchange rate,
defined as an exchange rate such as to induce balanced trade12 at full employment in the medium term.
But suppose that exports have not yet built up to their steady-state level, so that there is a trade deficit
at full employment.  Does it follow that devaluation could necessarily reconcile internal and external
balance in the short run?  No.  The short-run effect of devaluation in switching expenditure toward
domestic goods is small, and the capital inflow predicted by Dornbusch's overshooting model requires
national creditworthiness that is currently lacking in Eastern Europe.  Thus the mechanism that will
achieve external balance with a floating exchange rate is a downward float until domestic inflation has
deflated real money balances to a sufficiently depressed level to achieve trade balance, at the cost of the
level of output.  Internal balance is sacrificed.
It may be possible to limit that output loss by restricting imports, which is what Western
Europe did during the years of postwar reconstruction.  This can be efficient if protection that is-26-
     13  These were estimated by Dani Rodrik as amounting to 2.9% of GDP in Poland, 3.7% of
GDP in Hungary and 5.4% of GDP in Czechoslovakia (Rodrik 1992, Table 5.2).
confined to imports that compete with domestic production can buy more expenditure-switching per
unit of inflationary pressure than can be achieved by devaluation, which seems likely although not
quite tautological.  Where this alternative exists, to tolerate a loss of output because of the foreign
exchange constraint is another case of social waste.  Where it does not exist, a foreign exchange
shortage has to be classified as imposing an unavoidable loss.  Of course, output losses imposed by
the foreign exchange constraint provide a classic case for international aid.
Several East European countries have undoubtedly been foreign-exchange constrained in the
past couple of years;  perhaps most critically Bulgaria, but also Romania and in 1991 the Soviet Union.
All the successor states of the Soviet Union face a foreign exchange constraint in the future, although
Russia has by far the best prospect of overcoming that constraint relatively rapidly (because of its
supplies of energy and raw materials).  These constraints are more severe than can plausibly be dealt
with by transitional tariffs.  Other countries may also have suffered from a foreign exchange shortage:
if the worsened Central European terms of trade consequent on the demise of CMEA13 can be partially
blamed for their output declines, this is the channel through which it would have worked.  But since
it is not clear that they have in fact been foreign-exchange constrained, I have not included them in this
row of Table 3.
At this point it is necessary to extend the taxonomy that we hijacked from the developing
countries, because there are at least two other demand-side effects that have been blamed for reducing
output in Eastern Europe.  The first of these is demand-shift.  When demand shifts from one type
of good to another, resources have to be redeployed from the former to the latter.  There is typically
a delay between their release and their reabsorption in a different activity, and in the meantime they
produce nothing and in consequence output declines.  For example, in Czechoslovakia last year
government spending fell by an estimated 12% of GDP (OECD 1991):  most of that was offset by tax
cuts so that in due course the main effect will be on the composition rather than the level of output,
but because this redeployment takes time the short-run effect is to decrease output.  -27-
An important cause of demand shift in an economy integrating itself into the world economy
is from the production of import substitutes to that of exports.  This shift is in the nature of an
investment - an immediate cost that will bear fruit in the future as redeployment into higher-
productivity activities occurs.  But it is nevertheless inefficient to have large pools of resources that
are made idle years before they can be reabsorbed elsewhere.  This provides the justification for
transitional "senile industry" protection:  it is better that, until they can be reabsorbed elsewhere,
resources should produce goods of low value-added than that they should not add any value at all.
Hence I have to divide my entry in column 3 into a "slow demand-shift" that is an investment and an
"excessive demand-shift" that goes into the category of avoidable social loss.
A special form of demand shift occurs when goods that were formerly produced are no longer
wanted.  The unwanted goods are not only military supplies but also inventories that were accumulated
as a store of value in the absence of financial assets capable of fulfilling that role and investment goods
whose only purpose was to produce unwanted goods, including more investment goods with no end-
use (steel to build steelworks to build more steelworks...).   Production of fewer unwanted goods is
a benefit and not a cost.  
This is a particularly potent factor in the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, where the
military-industrial complex was vast, perhaps as much as 25% of GDP.  The surplus inventories and
pointless investment activities were also extensive.  It is remarkable that there are no serious estimates
of just how large the benefits of stopping producing unwanted goods have been, but they were
probably significant in all the countries, except perhaps Hungary.
Let us now turn to the supply side of the equation.  We can again start with the sort of
exogenous shocks that figured in the previous taxonomy, though there is not much reason to attribute
the decline in East European production to that source, except possibly for part of the fall in output
of petroleum in the former Soviet Union.
Of vastly more importance is the fact that price changes make some part of former output
uneconomic.  The extreme case is where the production of a good requires inputs with a higher value
(at world prices) than the value of the output - the case of negative value-added (NVA).  (Polish
production of semi-tropical flowers is a case in point.)  Hughes and Hare (1991) calculated that-28-
between 19% and 24% of industrial production in the three Central European countries resulted in
negative value-added.  That may be an over-estimate inasmuch as it assumes zero ability to substitute
inputs, but on the other hand it makes no allowance for the costs of pollution.  (Some observers also
question the plausibility of their finding that the food processing industries of Central Europe all
seem to have negative value-added.)
In general an end to the production of goods with negative value-added is another benefit
almost as great as ending the production of bads.  It is true that Ronald McKinnon (1991) has argued
that industries producing negative value-added should be given time to adjust to the new vector of
input prices confronting them, on infant-industry grounds.  Clearly it is conceivable that some
enterprises that presently produce negative value-added might be driven out of business by a
precipitate move to world prices despite having the potential to adjust and become viable, but I must
say that I would want to see evidence that the present value of saving an activity was likely to be
positive before I went out of my way to defend value subtraction.  In the absence of evidence we
should cheer the demise of such activities.  
Activities may also be forced to close down where value-added is positive but too low to
support conventional levels of payments to the factors of production involved.  Modest output losses
as such activities are closed gradually and the resources are absorbed in other, more profitable, activities
are an investment.  But in excess we come again to the case for senile industry protection - a far more
promising cause in Eastern Europe than infant industry protection à la McKinnon.
Another supply-side reason for output declines has been the dislocation of input supplies.
As enterprises stop supplying goods through the traditional channels formerly dictated by the
planners, their customers may have difficulty in arranging alternative sources of supply.  Similarly, there
are fears in the former Soviet Union that the new international boundaries between the sovereign states
may result in disruption of input supplies.  The output lost through such dislocation of input
supplies is pure social loss.  
What is not clear is whether this is a cost that can legitimately be attributed to liberalization,
rather than to the collapse of the old regime.  Consider the Soviet case, which is where the disruption
of input supplies has certainly been a major factor.  As Soviet central planning broke down, more and-29-
more enterprises began to neglect their duty to fulfill their state orders before selling some of their
output at free-market prices through the commercial exchanges.  These exchanges are still less than two
years old, but there are already over 400 of them dealing in everything from primary commodities to
used steel rails to consumer goods.  Their rapid emergence is a standing refutation of the charge that
Russians lack entrepreneurial instincts.  At first blush one would assume that a market that provided
a mechanism for enterprises to relieve their bottlenecks by buying critical missing inputs could hardly
fail to be welfare-enhancing;  but diversion of supplies to the exchanges has also been responsible for
creating bottlenecks.  In an environment where there is no mechanism that enables managers to know
which state orders are supplying critical needs and which are dispensable (even if there were an
incentive for them to respect such priorities, which was in fact also lacking), it is at least possible that
a part of the reason for the collapse in output is that input supplies have been arbitrarily disrupted in
order to earn the much higher prices available from sales on the commercial exchanges.  Presumably
one benefit of liberalization will be to make the more conservative enterprises willing to trade on the
exchanges (or bid the market price), thus diminishing the danger that supplies will be diverted from
high-priority to low-priority uses.  That gives ground to hope that, after the current initial period of
chaos as supply relationships are changed, liberalization should decrease rather than increase output
losses from this source.
The final supply-side effect comes from a credit squeeze.  This is a factor that has been
emphasized by Calvo and Coricelli (1992).  Withdrawal of subsidies coupled with massive devaluation
and severe limits on credit expansion meant that enterprises no longer commanded the credit to buy
the inputs needed to continue producing the former level of output.  Enterprises resorted to increased
levels of inter-enterprise credit to try and circumvent the shortage of bank credit - a circumvention that
the authorities have also tried to limit.  Calvo and Coricelli argue that this can explain a number of the
apparent paradoxes of the Polish stabilization programme:  the coexistence in labour-controlled
enterprises of high profitability and wages less than the ceiling allowed by the incomes policy, and the
coexistence of continuing inflationary pressures with the fall in output and rise in unemployment.
This seems to me convincing, though perhaps I should confess that my approval may be encouraged
by the confirmation the theory seems to provide for one of my longest-standing convictions, which-30-
is that any government that allows its exchange rate to become seriously misaligned is asking for big
trouble.  
Specifically, I can still blame some of Poland's troubles on the excessive Polish devaluation
even though Gomulka tells me there was no real balance effect.  Conditions in Czechoslovakia seem
to be similar, and possibly the expansion of inter-enterprise credits in Hungary also suggests that
credit stringency may have been involved there.  A credit squeeze beyond what is necessary to control
demand and to impose hard budget constraints on enterprises seems counterproductive, and
accordingly I describe it as imposing an avoidable loss.
Assessing the Conventional Wisdom
Does the above assessment of the factors that have led to the collapse in output in the
economies in transition suggest that the sort of advice we economists have been giving is seriously
flawed?
Note first that Table 3 suggests there are a lot of reasons why output might have been
expected to decline.  Unfortunately, apart from Rodrik's estimates of the impact of the Soviet demand
shock and the Hare and Hughes attempt to measure the prevalence of negative value-added, we have
no quantitative estimates that would help decompose output declines among the various possible
causes.  I am not sure that my taxonomy is perfect, i.e. mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive,
but I hope that it may be good enough to stimulate some effort into decomposing the sources of the
collapse.  Until we have a reasonably convincing decomposition of the causes of output decline we
cannot do much to develop policy recommendations.
Second, some output losses were positively desirable, others were unavoidable, and others were
in the nature of an investment.  I do not doubt that avoidable losses remain, but their magnitude is
less, perhaps substantially less, than that of the decline in output.
Third, a general accusation of excessive demand deflation appears unwarranted.  That
complaint can legitimately be made against policy in Czechoslovakia, but elsewhere I see little
justification.-31-
Apart from excessive demand deflation in Czechoslovakia, the table suggests two other areas
where policy may have erred.  One is in not providing substantial transitional protection to buffer the
adjustment process:  in early 1991 I heard a high Polish official boast that Poland's trade regime was
as liberal as that of Hong Kong.  He may have exaggerated slightly, but one cannot doubt that several
countries did make a dash for world prices.  It is one thing to argue in favour of starting off
adjustment quickly on a broad front, it is another to demand that the system go straight to free trade
prices.   The problems of adjustment in response to demand shift, a foreign-exchange shortage and
low value-added as a result of price changes all seem to call for transitional protection.  This is one of
the issues that remains controversial among economists advising Eastern Europe, and perhaps this
is where I should have distinguished my minimum bang from the big bang.
The other possible policy error was to squeeze credit excessively.  One decision that was made
in every stabilization programme so far was to inflate away the monetary overhang (even where there
wasn't one, in Czechoslovakia) rather than to undertake a monetary reform, as happened in most
European countries other than Britain after World War Two.  It is increasingly argued that this has
been a mistake (Dornbusch 1991, Newbery 1991, Sturzenegger 1991, Williamson 1991).  The monetary
overhang was inflated away by a policy of severe devaluation, to an exchange rate close to the prior
black (or parallel) market rate, accompanied by price liberalization.  The fact that the exchange rate was
fixed subsequent to its devaluation was described as "providing a nominal anchor";  since the exchange
rate was so devalued as to pull prices up, however, it would have been more accurate to describe it as
providing a nominal balloon.  This large devaluation gave enterprises head room to raise prices and
wages without the hard budget constraint biting, and presumably a degree of inflationary momentum
built up from what was supposed to be a one-shot price increase.  The monetary overhang was quickly
not only inflated away but replaced by a credit shortage, which depressed supply and thus output while
not necessarily being effective at controlling inflation.
The alternative policy would have involved a monetary reform designed to absorb the monetary
overhang without large price increases, on the model of what was widely done in Western Europe after
World War II, accompanied by an initial wage freeze and an exchange rate that was fixed so as to
validate the existing wage level.  The idea of monetary reform was rejected out of hand in the Soviet-32-
Union, following the bitter public reaction to Pavlov's "monetary reform" of January 1991.  That was
surely a mistake.  Inflating away the overhang results in its confiscation just as much as any monetary
reform does.  Moreover, confiscating money balances in excess of some threshold is not the only
possible form of monetary reform.  Indeed, it seems a very silly form in countries that have a vast stock
of assets needing to be privatized and virtually no non-monetary savings that the public can call on
in order to buy those assets.  It is not practicable to mop up the overhang directly by selling assets
because privatization takes time if it is to be done properly.  But it would have been possible to issue
some form of "privatization certificates", that could have been used to purchase assets in due course,
for money holdings in excess of whatever threshold was allowed to be converted into the new money.
A different type of complaint is that the reform programmes have once again committed the
mistake of concentrating overwelmingly on the demand side, when in fact the real problems of the ex-
socialist economies lie on the supply side.  This complaint comes in two main variants.  One is the
complaint that privatization has been too delayed.  I think that most of us would have liked to see
privatization move faster, especially of the supply and distribution network in Russia.  Actually I am
sure the same is true of Gaidar and his team, but small privatization is a local responsibility in Russia,
not something whose pace can be decreed by the economic team.  On the other hand, I would resist
the idea that rapid large-scale privatization of large enterprises could have helped, since it takes time
to privatize well and it is most inadvisable to privatize before price reform for fear of driving viable
enterprises into bankruptcy.
The other complaint, voiced in a recent paper of Tad Rybczynski (1991), is that banking reform
(including recapitalization) needed to precede or accompany price liberalization, so that the financial
system would have been in a position to carry out its function of intermediating funds to those
enterprises able to make a supply-side response.  Once again, this is something that one would surely
have liked to see happen sooner, although there is a question as to how much a reconstruction of
balance sheets could do before the banks acquire personnel trained in the art of loan appraisal.  Despite
this caveat, I think that there is a case for wiping the slate clean of debt inherited from the past so as
to permit a real hardening of budget constraints - a sort of equivalent to monetary reform so far as the
enterprise and banking sectors are concerned.-33-
What emerges from this review is that there may have been too little transitional protection,
that one might have wished for more rapid privatization (especially of the supply and distribution
networks in Russia), and that a widespread mistake has been made in not opting for monetary reform
and an analogous sanitization of the balance sheets of enterprises and banks.  But note that those
latter operations would have been accomplished most naturally as another component of a bang, thus
tending to make bangs bigger rather than smaller.  Is transitional protection the only difference
between a minimum bang and a big bang - the only crumb we should concede to the criticisms of the
gradualists?  
The gradualist case is based on the superior performance of countries that have opted for a
more gradual strategy of adjustment, notably China and Hungary.  China has certainly shown
impressive growth ever since it started liberalizing something over a decade ago.  However, the
existence of a large, relatively self-contained agrarian sector just itching to get back to non-collectivist
production practices created an opportunity for gradual reform in China of a sort that was absent in
Eastern Europe.  
Hungary is perhaps a more relevant comparator.  It is true that Hungary has also experienced
an output decline, but it is somewhat less severe than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.  Moreover, there
is wide agreement that it is the best-placed of the East European countries (excluding Eastern
Germany) to resume growth in the near future.  
These two cases do demonstrate that gradualist strategies exist:  it is evidently not true that
a committment to gradualism guarantees that a country will never make the transition.  The analogy
of a chasm that has to be crossed in a single leap is unpersuasive - so let us resolve that in future we
will analyze these questions and not resort to analogies, which are often misleading.
But existence is not the same as optimality.  It is at least possible that Hungary would be
better off by now if it had invested in bolder reforms in the past, even if that strategy had brought with
it a larger initial output decline. Where a country has a choice between a decisive package and
gradualism, as Czechoslovakia did, it still seems to me sensible to make the choice that was made in
Czechoslovakia.  I limit this endorsement strictly to the set of microeconomic reforms that marked
the move to the market and not to the macroeconomic policy that followed the bang, which I have-34-
     14  Eastern Germany may make it much sooner, but no other country can expect external
assistance on a comparable scale.
already argued was poorly conceived.  Vaclav Klaus reminds one of Mrs Thatcher:  doing a rather good
job of pushing through a number of badly needed microeconomic reforms, but then spoiling the
results for a rather long short run by refusing to think seriously about the design of macro policy.
It is also relevant to note that what is probably the biggest output collapse of all (though
admittedly it is not shown as such in the figures in Table 1) cannot be attributed to a big bang,
because it occurred in a country - Albania - where no reform programme has yet started.
However, for most of the economies in transition the really decisive argument in favour of a
big bang, or at least of a minimum bang, is quite different to that discussed in my first lecture.  Most
of those economies - the exceptions being Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Eastern Germany - were in
a state of collapse when the reformers took office.  Prices were rising, despite the maintenance of price
controls;  many goods had disappeared from the shelves;  there were large budget deficits that had
cumulated over time into monetary overhangs;  the balance of payments was in crisis;  the currency had
become  absurdly  undervalued  on  the  black  market,  indicating  a  pervasive  lack  of  confidence;
corruption was rampant;  output had started to decline.  Under those conditions the option of
gradualism - of allowing a private sector to grow in parallel to the public sector, and making modest
changes one at a time calculated to repair the most glaring defect evident at that moment in the public
sector - simply does not exist.  Drastic problems call for drastic remedies.  The architects of reform
in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia have simply bowed to force majeure in opting for big bangs.
What is at Stake?
Let me devote a few minutes to discussing what is at stake in securing a successful transition.
Let us start by considering what is at stake for the peoples of the countries directly involved.
Success will presumably lead to absorption in the Western mainstream:  the construction of
pluralist civil societies practicing democracy and enjoying increasing prosperity.  It will take a long time
- close to a half century under the best of circumstances14 - before living standards will approach those
in North America, Northern Europe and Japan, but communism bequeathed these countries-35-
populations that were sufficiently educated to give one reasonable confidence that they will succeed
in starting to converge on the leading countries once sensible institutions and policies are in place.
The big doubt must be whether they will have the patience to start the process.  Once recovery is under
way, the fact that they are still a lot less affluent than the other peoples of the temperate zone is
unlikely to seem unbearably irksome.
I doubt whether the alternative to this comfortable (though to some doubtless unexciting)
future is a reversion to anything approaching Stalinism or fascism.  Something resembling Argentina
in the decades between Peron and Menem is more likely:  a succession of coups and democratic
restorations, of populist experiments that bring temporary upturns at the cost of further undermining
the fundamentals and programs that promise to restore the fundamentals but are never sustained to
the point of giving recovery a chance.  Or perhaps (particularly in Russia) it will involve the collapse
of the authority of the central state and the emergence of warring subjurisdictions, as we have seen this
past year in Yugoslavia.  Whatever the form this alternative takes, the dangers of mass misery, of
endless calls on the Western purse, of large-scale migration, of environmental disasters with a global
impact, and of violent conflict that could even have a nuclear dimension, are vastly greater than they
will be with a successful transition.  I cannot understand those who claim that some collectivist
abstraction called the "national interest of the United States" is uninvolved.
What is at stake for the developing countries?  One encounters (or, in the case of Latin
America, used to encounter, for Latin self-confidence has flooded back recently) widespread concern
that trade, aid, investment, and technical expertise will be diverted from them to the economies in
transition.  Obviously no one can guarantee that no such diversion will occur, and indeed the most
serious study I know of that tried to look at the diversion of trade and investment (Collins and Rodrik
1991) concluded that it could be significant, especially through the higher interest rates that are likely
to result from increased investment demand.  In one sense I would like to believe that the diversion
of economic expertise away from the developing countries will be a blow to them - although I must
confess that I have not quite convinced myself that they will miss us that much! It also looks to me
as though the aid going to the East is largely additional rather than at the expense of the (almost-36-
     15  In one area the threat of diversion is real, because the need for aid will be long-term.  I refer
to the outlook for the Central Asian republics.  
     16  Collins and Rodrik 1991, Vavilov and Vjugin 1992.
invariably much poorer) previous aid recipients.15  I see little danger that FDI will be diverted away
from existing recipients:  direct investment expands to fill the investment opportunities available, so
new opportunities in the East will mean primarily more direct investment worldwide rather than
diversion of a fixed fund from one area to another.  I would even argue that the same may happen with
trade:  more production of clothing in East Europe may encourage West Europe to import more
clothing and divert the resources into producing goods that can be exported to the East, rather than
cutting imports from the third world.  I am not saying this is inevitable:  but I do believe that those
interested in influencing policy should focus on the need to try and make it happen, rather than belly-
ache about a threat from the East.
Another group of questions concerns the relations between East and West.  If things go right,
I would expect the East to be absorbed in the West.  This is their desire, and I can see no legitimate
Western interest in preventing it happening.  The process has indeed already started, and it will
continue this year with the entry of most or all of the 15 former Soviet republics into the IMF and
World Bank.  If the transition makes good progress, it will continue with the entry of the Central
European countries into the OECD and subsequently into the European Community, and with
Russian entry making the G7 into the G8.  But the EC will have to think about much more
enlargement than just absorbing the three countries of Central Europe:  the real long-run question is
whether Europe is interpreted to include or exclude the two countries that straddle both Europe and
Asia, namely Russia and Turkey.  All these new entrants will seem much less strange as the trade
patterns of the countries of the East adjust westward, as research suggests they will.16
Concluding Remarks
I would conclude that we can now identify several respects in which, with the benefit of
hindsight, we can see that the transition could have been handled better.  We could have benefited
from  more  transitional protection and early small privatization, Czechoslovakia adopted an-37-
unnecessarily tough macro stance, and above all it was a mistake not to follow the path of monetary
reform and sanitization of the balance sheets of enterprises and banks to let them start off with a clean
slate.  Perhaps some of these things could still help, though it would have been much better if they
had been done sooner, at the time of the bang.
Nevertheless, the primary advice that we should address to Eastern Europe at the present stage
must be to hang tough where a bang has already happened and to grit their teeth and take the plunge
in those places where it has still not occurred.  There are no demons whose ouster will take the pain
out of the transition, and no panaceas whose implementation will guarantee a rapid turnround.  To
say this is not to claim that policy has been perfect or that we should stop searching for improvements,
such as summarized in the preceding paragraph.  But it is to recognize that there is a far greater danger
of the transition being aborted because of a surrender to populist pressures than because some
desirable policy modification remains unmade.
Such advice is hypocritical without a willingness to help.  But once again we encounter here
one of the profound changes in policy attitudes that has crystallized during the past decade:  we no
longer take it as axiomatic that more aid is better.  Aid has sometimes been used to perpetuate that
which needs to be ended to give recovery any chance.  To avoid this danger, aid must be geared to
supporting programs of real reform.  Where such reform programmes are in place, we should be
prepared to spend real money.  That criterion suggests to me that we have been spending too little in
Bulgaria and perhaps Romania and have been much too hesitant in offering serious aid - a stabilization
fund and balance of payments support - to Russia once they take the next step of demonstrating that
the budget is indeed under control and that the central bank will enforce a stringent monetary policy.
The present economic team needs Western endorsement in a form that the Russian people can
understand will be of benefit to them, in order to strengthen its political hand in the infighting that
is likely to continue in Moscow for a long time yet.
It is a pity to end a discussion of such momentous issues by policy advice almost as boring
as that which one dispenses when one testifies to the US Congress ("fix the budget deficit").  But the
duty of economists is to give good advice rather than to entertain, so I do my duty.-38-
TABLE 1
Output Changes in Eastern Europe 1988-91 (%)
                                                                                                                 
GDP Industrial Production








Soviet Union -25 -30
Memoranda
US 1933/29 -30
UK 1930/28  -6
Germany 1932/28 -11 -72
     1946/39 -55
Japan  1945/39 -50  na
                                                                                                                  
Sources: Morgan Stanley, "Greater Europe 1982 - The Year of Living Dangerously",
EuroStrategy No. 14, January 1982.
Angus Maddison, The World Economy in the Twentieth Century, OECD, Paris, 1989.
B. Eichengreen and M. Uzan, "The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications
for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union", mimeo, 1991.-39-
TABLE 2
A Taxonomy of the Possible Causes of Output Decline in Developing Countries
                                                                                                                  
External Demand: Exogenous decline (world recession)
Overvalued currency (inflation and fixed exchange-rate)
Internal Demand: Keynesian demand deficiency
- induced by FX-shortage (2-gap model)
Supply: Exogenous shocks (weather)
                                                                                                                  40
TABLE 3
Possible Causes of Output Collapse in the Economies in Transition
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                         
Cause Countries involved Welfare implications
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                       
External demand: Exogenous decline Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia Unavoidable loss
Poland, Romania, East Germany
     Overvalued currency East Germany Avoidable loss when excessive
(unavoidable in East Germany)
Internal demand:  Keynesian Czechoslovakia; Poland? Avoidable loss when excessive
   
-FX shortage Bulgaria, Romania, SU,  Avoidable/unavoidable loss
1
successor states  
   
     Demand-shift Czechoslovakia, Poland Slow: investment
Excessive: avoidable social loss
    -Unwanted goods Russia, all Benefit
Supply:     Exogenous shocks Russian oil Unavoidable loss
Uneconomic output Widespread NVA: benefit
LVA: avoidable loss when excessive
Input dislocation Russia, CIS Avoidable loss
Credit squeeze Poland? Czechoslovakia? Hungary? Avoidable loss
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                
Note: 1. Depending on whether transitional protection can buy more expenditure-switching per unit of inflationary pressure
than devaluation.-41-
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